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BOOK REVIEWS 
Ocean Policy and Law: The Case of Brazil 
by Michael A. Moms· 
EDITOR'S NOTE 
This article previews a forthcoming book by this author, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE 
SEA: THE CASE OF BRAZIL (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, Frederick A. Praeger, 
Editor). Two long chapters in the book should be of particular interest to our readers. 
Chapter 3, "Brazilian Ocean Policy in Historical Perspective," surveys Brazilian participation 
in regional and global maritime conferences up to the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Particular attention is given to Brazilian interaction with other 
Latin American States and with the United States. A host of unilateral, bilateral, sub-regional, 
regional and global measures and conferences are surveyed to discern the essential features shap-
ing Brazilian ocean policy up to the 1970s. To date no studies have dealt explicitly with the 
historical background conditioning the emergence of Brazilian ocean policy, and those which 
have implicitly addressed some related questions have reached different conclusions than those 
reached here. By setting out the historical record, any misunderstandings about the contem-
porary performance of Brazil, a leader in Latin America, will be lessened. Ocean policy may be a 
relatively new facet of national development in developing States, but there is already a con-
siderable historical record which conditions policy initiatives. These policy initiatives acquire 
considerable importance in the case of an emerging major power such as Brazil. The important 
and distinctive position of Brazil leads to a serious qualification of revisionist interpretations of 
the evolution of the law of the sea. 
Chapter 4, •• Brazil at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, " brings the 
legal narrative up to date. Brazil affects and is affected by the on-going global law of the sea 
negotiations in significant ways. As Brazil began to emerge as a major power in the years leading 
up to UNCLOS III, its national ocean policy has had a dramatic impact on global law of the sea 
negotiations. Brazil's participation in UNCLOS III offers a particularly good vantage point from 
which to analyze its more prominent international role as an emerging major power and its 
significant contribution to international law and organization. 
UNCLOS III, in turn, affects Brazil. The conference is concerned with establishing a revised 
global regime for the oceans within which Brazil must operate as well as with some specific legal 
rules which will affect the major Brazilian maritime sectors. Chapter 4 accordingly focuses on the 
broad implications of the emerging ocean order for both national and international zone issues 
within which Brazilian ocean policy must operate. More specific implications ofUNCLOS III for 
the major maritime sectors - naval affairs, ocean resources, and shipping - are also given some 
attention, in order to complement more detailed discussions of these sectors in subsequent 
chapters of the book . 
• Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University. The author was Coordinator of 
Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute during 1972-73 on the topic, "Brazil's Interna-
tional Role in the Seventies." 
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Together, Chapters 3 and 4 may present the most comprehensive profile of a major developing 
State at international maritime conferences and negotiations. The legal analysis of Brazilian 
ocean policy in these two chapters is complemented by the exposition of historical, political, 
economic, and military perspectives in other chapters. The legal viewpoint is interwoven 
throughout with the other perspectives because the global legal regime for the oceans affects all 
maritime activities. The rest of this preview puts the legal position of Brazilian ocean policy in its 
larger foreign policy context and examines the implications therefrom. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT 
Brazil is one of the few viable Third W orId candidates for a relatively rapid 
transition from developing, somewhat dependent status to developed, major 
power status. Not only does Brazil appear to be crossing the threshold from 
underdevelopment to development, but it also seems headed toward the rank 
of a major power.! 
Progress toward developed, major power status ultimately depends on 
Brazil's own continuing domestic and international growth, although 
developments in the international system and in key diplomatic relationships 
with other states also set limits on growth and upward mobility. Brazil's 
gradual movement upward in international status has coincided with some 
fundamental changes in the international system and in key diplomatic rela-
tions with other states, especially the United States. U.S.-Brazilian relations 
traditionally have been close, with the United States occupying a central posi-
tion in Brazil's diplomatic constellation. More recently, fundamental changes 
in U.S. global strategy and hemispheric policy have coincided with changes in 
Brazilian policy to alter considerably the traditional contour of bilateral rela-
tions. Changes in the international system have reinforced these 
developments. Changes on each of these international dimensions, all relative-
ly favorable to Brazil's rise, may be characterized as follows: 1) the interna-
tional system has been evolving from a bipolar toward a multipolar order; 2) 
Brazilian foreign policy has been evolving from a position of weakness toward 
a position of strength; and 3) U.S.-Brazilian relations have been evolving 
from a state of relative dependency and inequality towards one of greater in-
dependence and equality. 
Change in each area, however, has been uneven: the international system is 
stilI largely bipolar in the military sphere; Brazilian foreign policy is still 
hampered by important areas of weakness; and U.S.-Brazilian relations are 
still influenced by a legacy of dependency. In addition some other changes 
have tended to brake Brazil's growth. 
1. Considerable attention has been focused in recent years on the emergence of Brazil as a ma-
jor power. See, e.g., W. PERRY, CONTEMPORARY BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE INTERNA· 
TIONAL STRATEGY OF AN EMERGING POWER (Foreign Policy Papers 1976); R.M. SCHNEIDER, 
BRAZIL: FOREIGN POLICY OF A FUTURE WORLD POWER (1976). For an analysis by the author of 
Brazil's emergence as a major power, particularly into international affairs and some of the con-
sequences of this new role, see Morris, A Nova Posi,(io do Brasil no Mundo, GECX:;RAFIA E PLAN· 
JAMENTO 11 (Univ. of Sao Paulo Occassional Paper 1974). 
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Change and continuity in this foreign policy environment therefore have af-
fected Brazil's rise in complex ways. The position of Brazil in the world is im-
proving, in the sense of being more extensive and independent than previous-
Iy, but change and continuity intermingle. In order to clarify these relation-
ships, key factors of change and continuity in the international system and 
their economic, political, and military implications for Brazil will be noted 
briefly. The trends in Brazilian foreign policy have been shaped by and also 
have shaped this international environment, and will be subsequently ana-
lyzed. Key characteristics of the international system and of Brazilian foreign 
policy constitute the setting for the topic of the book, i. e., trends in Brazilian 
ocean policy. In a final section of this preview Brazilian ocean policy is related 
to this larger policy setting and the organization and rationale of the book are 
set forth. 
II. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Certain aspects of the international system remain unaltered: the nuclear 
balance is still shaped by the two superpowers; the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China are still basically antagonistic to the United States; 
and Japan and Western Europe are still the United States' most valued allies. 
Nevertheless the international system is shifting gradually from a bipolar 
order toward a multipolar one. The resurgence of Japan and a united Europe 
have contributed toward economic multipolarity and the new pragmatism of 
the P. R. C. has contributed to political multipolarity. The achievement by the 
Soviet Union of nuclear parity, the commercial challenge posed by Japan and 
the European Common Market, and the gradual expansion of Chinese in-
fluence have all contributed to a relative decline of U. S. power. The 
emergence of multipolarity has involved changes in the positions of all five 
major poles of power in the international system - the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Japan, a united Europe, and the P.R.C. 
Some aspects of the emerging new order augur well for peace. The United 
States and the Soviet Union have eased their cold war competition by seeking 
detente and the United States and the P.R.C. have moved toward rapproche-
ment. Other aspects of the evolving international system are ridden with con-
flicts. Serious problems have arisen between the Soviet Union and its former 
ally, China, just as U.S. relations with Japan and the European Common 
Market have been troubled by failure to forge mutually satisfactory economic 
relations. And Third World States generally are growing more restive with the 
existing order. 
The shift from a bipolar system toward a multipolar one has important 
economic, political, and security implications for Brazil's position in the 
world. 
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A. Economic Implications 
The international economy has been relatively congenial to Brazil's gradual 
emergence as a developed State, although there have been increasing dif-
ficulties in sustaining growth since the 1973-74 oil crisis. A growing world 
economy and consequent availability of capit'il have been a positive effect on 
Brazil's economy. Greater world economic multipolarity has provided addi-
tional foreign sources of trade, investment, and finance, which played a key 
role in the 1968-73 economic boom and have helped sustain growth since then. 
The United States is still Brazil's largest single trading partner and foreign in-
vestor and trade and investment between Brazil and the United States have 
been growing in absolute terms, but at a slower rate than that between Brazil 
andJapan and Western Europe. The U.S. share of cumulative foreign invest-
ment in Brazil has declined from about one-half in the early 1960s to about 
one-third of total foreign investment in the country at present and the U.S. 
share of Brazilian trade fell from 33.7 per cent in 1964 to between a fourth and 
a fifth of the total in recent years. Western Europe and Japan together now 
share over one-third of Brazilian trade and about half of foreign investment in 
Brazil. In recent years, petroleum has averaged about a quarter of total im-
ports, mostly from the Middle East. 2 
The declining U.S. share of trade and foreign investment is, in part, simply 
a natural concomitant of greater economic multipolarity. However, the 
decline also reflects problems in the bilateral relationship. For Brazil, impor-
tant aspects of present bilateral relations were shaped during the period of 
greater Brazilian dependence on the United States, so that greater economic 
multi polarity , by lessening reliance on its traditionally dominant ally, has 
been welcomed. 
Brazilian vulnerability to external economic conditions still remains con-
siderable, and the Brazilian ability to shape these conditions continues to be 
relatively limited. Recent external developments with unfavorable implica-
tions for Brazil include uncertain economic conditions in the developed States 
and soaring oil prices. In fact, the increasing openness of Brazil's economy 
and greater reliance on foreign investment, commerce, and technology tend to 
make it more vulnerable than previously to such adverse developments in the 
international economy. 
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: BRAZIL(1977); U.S. DEP'TOFCOM-
MERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1978); 
see also Baer & Von Doellinger, Determinants of Brazil's Economic Policy, in LATIN AMERICA AND 
WORLD ECONOMY: A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER 147 a. Grunwald ed. 1978). U.S. aid 
is not discussed here, since the United States is phasing out its bilateral development assistance 
programs to Brazil. Increased Brazilian capabilities and greater U.S. aid emphasis on 
multilateral rather than bilateral channels are responsible for this change. The United States does 
remain the largest donor to multilateral lending institutions, from which Brazil is a major recip-
ient of assistance, but this has not presented problems for bilateral relations with Brazil, in part 
because the U.S. exercises much less control over multilateral aid than bilateral aid. 
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New forms of dependency, however, m&y be more acceptable than the 
traditional ones. Brazil's economic dependency is much more diffuse than 
previously, since no one State occupies a dominant position in its foreign 
economic relations. Rapid transition to developed status in a multipolar order 
still involves national reliance on the world economy. The Brazilian economic 
model places great emphasis on external economic relations as an engine for 
domestic growth. However, most developed States are themselves subject to 
similar vulnerabilities because of increasing global interdependence. Some re-
cent studies have recognized that Brazilian dependence in general and on the 
United States in particular has varied over time on a number oflevels. Viewed 
from such a dynamic perspective, Brazilian dependence has tended to 
decrease in recent years as national economic power and diversification of 
foreign economic relations have accelerated. 3 
Domestic developments have complemented the relatively favorable global 
setting to project Brazil into a more prominent international position. An im-
pressive array of natural and human resources is being mobilized to support 
increasingly diversified industrial and agricultural production. Brazil's poten-
tial for major power status long has been acknowledged, but this appears to be 
attainable only with increasing mobilization of national resources. Brazil's an-
nual gross national product is over 100 billion dollars. This is about three 
times that of the nearest South American competitor, larger than that of any 
other developing State, and ranks tenth in the world. Greater economic power 
is supporting an increasingly active foreign policy with resultant expansion of 
Brazilian influence in the international arena. 
However, the transition to developed, major power status, even if relatively 
rapid, promises to last until at least the end of this century. Brazil's internal 
development has been uneven with rapid industrial growth in south-central 
Brazil taking priority over balanced regional development and income 
redistribution. Per capita national income of somewhat over 1,000 dollars falls 
short of that in leading industrial States. Domestic development and interna-
tional influence will be hindered as long as fundamental disparities in the 
economy are not corrected. 
B. Political Implications 
Multipolarity has tended to increase diplomatic flexibility for Third World 
States, especially the larger, more dynamic ones, such as Brazil. New poles of 
power have increased alternatives. In addition, cold war competition has 
become more diffuse and has shifted from the military to the economic and 
3. Packenham, Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 1964, in BRAZIL IN THE SEVENTIES 
89 (R. Roett ed. 1976); Treverton, Latin America in World Politics: The Next Decade, in ADELPHI 
PAPERS, Summer 1977, at 31. 
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political spheres. As Brazil emerges as a major power in this setting, it oc-
cupies a distinctive position between the First and Third Worlds. Nonetheless, 
Brazilian access to key decisions affecting the contours of the global order re-
mains difficult. As an aspiring major power, Brazil has objected to this lack of 
access or "freezing of [the structures of] world power."4 
The United States has recognized Brazil's new status as the predominant 
power in Latin America and has sought to adjust the bilateral relationship ac-
cordingly. Since the United States and Brazil continue to share important 
common interests and both sides favor compromise in resolving differences, 
the transition to greater Brazilian independence and equality in the bilateral 
relationship has been facilitated. However, differences in perspective continue 
about the implications of Brazil's growth and emergence as a major power for 
the United States. 
Brazilian policy-makers continue to value close relations with the United 
States, but recognize that national growth tends to diversify foreign relations, 
lessen dependency, and lead to distinctive Brazilian interests, which do not 
necessarily correspond with those of the U.S. Increasingly vigorous pursuit of 
distinctive Brazilian interests contribute to a regional order, and indeed to a 
world order, unlike that envisaged by U.S. policy. 
U.S. policy, in contrast, still harbours a paternalistic attitude since Brazil's 
growth seems to be regarded in terms of relieving U. S. responsibilities on 
U. S. terms rather than as an autonomous process of national self-assertion. A 
key implication of the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on accommodation between 
the five major world power centers and relative U.S. disengagement from the 
Third World was the encouragement ofregional orders compatible with U.S. 
interests. 5 In this scheme, Brazil, as the only emerging major power in Latin 
America, would be delegated regional responsibilities by the U.S. and would 
assist the integration of a stable regional order into a five power world order. 
Subsequent U.S. administrations have continued to stress order in the Third 
World on U. S. terms while finding it difficult to commit sufficient resources to 
assist the evolution of compatible regional systems. Accordingly, the U.S. has 
continued to look (with uneven results) for strong regional allies, including 
Brazil, for support as regional poles of power and stability. 
4. De Araujo Castro, 0 Conge/amento do Pod" Mundial, 1972 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS 
POLiTicos 33. 
5. George Liska acknowledged that the Nixon Doctrine was deliberately ambiguous about this 
point, but that its logic led it to be vitally concerned with the emergence of stable regional orders 
in the developing world which would dovetail with entente between the five major world powers. 
Liska concluded that these U.S. policy preferences very likely would survive the Nixon ad-
ministration, since the Nixon Doctrine retained important aspects of past administrations' 
foreign policies while reshaping policy in response to new world events. Liska, The Third World: 
Regional Systems and Global Order, in RETREAT FROM EMPIRE?: THE FIRST NIXON ADMINISTRATION 
279 (R.E. Osgood ed. 1973). 
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C. Military Implications 
Security considerations, especially cold war competition between the two 
superpowers, tended to shape international politics during the bipolar era. 
The Third World acquired considerable importance as a cold war bat-
tleground. As a result, security interests seemed to require a substantial V.S. 
commitment to economic development of developing States, e.g., bilateral 
relations both before and after the 1964 coup included close collaboration bet-
ween the Brazilian and American militaries and sizable assistance for develop-
ment. Superpower detente and the emergence of multipolarity have con-
tributed to subsequent V. S. reassessment of its global security interests and 
commitment to Third World development. Superpower military competition 
has become less prominent and traditional American concern with communist 
threats in the Third World has been deemphasized. As on the economic front, 
bilateral military ties have declined relative to other international military con-
tacts. Compatible regional powers, as noted, are still encouraged to take up 
the slack left from a diminished V. S. world role to establish stable regional 
orders. 
Brazilian policy-makers have welcomed a more benign international securi-
ty environment, but they have explicitly rejected regional implications of re-
cent V. S. policy. Instead, they have moved to diversify military contacts en-
visaging self-sufficiency in the long run. The development of a mutually ac-
ceptable image of Brazil's influential position in the world is perhaps the most 
basic challenge posed for the bilateral relationship. 
III. TRENDS IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In spite of differences in emphasis, all military governments since the 1964 
coup have shared certain common aims, which differ in several important 
respects from those held by preceding civilian governments. A more active 
foreign policy has been promoted to assist domestic economic development 
and enhance national security. 6 Although this foreign policy orientation is 
primarily concerned with supporting domestic concerns, especially economic 
development and national security, correction of uneven regional develop-
ment and income disparities is not stressed. In sum, "foreign policy has 
become a conscious instrument of an increasingly conscious national develop-
ment policy."7 In the long run, the attainment of major power status is ex-
6. The Escola Superior de Guerra (National War College) doctrine linking development and 
security - development is necessary to overcome national weaknesses which ultimately threaten 
security, while security provides the necessary stability for development - has had a profoun, . 
impact on policymakers. See Chapters 2, 5 and 6 of INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEA: THE 
CASE OF BRAZIL for more details on ESG doctrine as related to ocean affairs. 
7. Tyson, Brazil, in LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES: AN ANALYSIS 223 (H.E. Davis & L. 
Wilson eds. 1975). 
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has emphasized its affinity of interests with Third World States in forging a 
more equitable international system. More recently some radical Third World 
interpretations of the New International Economic Order have posed 
awkward policy dilemmas for Brazil which favors more moderate, pragmatic 
approaches to change. 9 
Policy dilemmas posed for an emerging major power, such as Brazil, 
situated between the First and Third Worlds have been evident in bilateral 
dealings with developed States. Greater assertiveness of Brazilian interests has 
been directed toward reshaping traditional relationships with the United 
States, and toward gaining greater access to, and influence on, the interna-
tional order. Brazil's desire for change is relative since the bulk of Brazil's in-
ternational relationships have been and are likely to remain with developed 
States even with diversification. Accordingly, pressure for change tends to be 
limited to modifying the rules of the game to permit easier access to the "rich 
men's club" rather than overturning the rules as some Third World States less 
well endowed than Brazil appear to want. 
Some initiatives in foreign policy by civilian governments in the early 1960s 
resemble the above foreign policy developments - diversification, expansion 
of interests, and greater assertiveness of interests - more in appearance than 
in substance. In the early 1960s, Brazil was in a position of relative economic 
weakness so that foreign policy initiatives were sustained largely by rhetoric or 
ideology. A successful broadening and defense of Brazilian interests interna-
tionally had to be undertaken from the position of strength which had 
developed from the 1960s and early 1970s. 
D. Pragmatism 
Pragmatism has increasingly displaced ideology as a foreign policy con-
sideration. During the first years of military government after the 1964 coup 
there was great concern with alleged communist subversion from Cuba and 
elsewhere, just as leftist ideological considerations tended to influence foreign 
policy during the last years of civilian government. The subsequent decline of 
the notion of "ideological frontiers" permitted a reassertion of Itamaraty's 
(the Brazilian foreign ministry) traditional low-key, moderate approach to 
diplomacy. While the Geisel administration has been more avowedly 
pragmatic and less ideological than the preceding military governments, they 
also tended to take pragmatic foreign policy postures on non-cold war matters. 
ters. 
9. W.A. SELCHER, BRAZIL'sMuLTILATERALRELATIONS: BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD WORLDS 
16-17, 75-76 (1978); see also Chapter 4 of INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEA: THE CASE OF 
BRAZIL 
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IV. TRENDS IN BRAZILIAN OCEAN POLICY 
The international aspects of Brazilian ocean affairs fall within the purview 
of Brazilian foreign policy, so Brazilian ocean policy reflects the four foreign 
policy characteristics sketched above and operates within the constraints and 
opportunities of the international system. The applicability of the four foreign 
policy characteristics to Brazilian ocean policy may be noted explicitly. 
First, Brazil's international maritime relations, long involving primarily the 
United States, have been diversifying rapidly over the past decade. Second, 
over the past decade, Brazilian maritime interests have likewise expanded 
quite rapidly and Brazil has emerged as a significant maritime power. Third, 
this rise in maritime status internationally has not been easy and has required 
greater assertiveness of maritime interests. The traditional ocean order in-
cludes "freedom of the seas" and liner conferences, which have appeared as 
examples of "freezing of power" from the perspective of an aspirant power 
such as Brazil. This required changing the existing ocean order and reshaping 
maritime relations with developed States. At the same time, Brazil has been 
reluctant to endorse radical planks or interpretations of the New International 
Economic Order as they apply to the maritime sphere, particularly the deep 
seabed.!O For example, Brazilian policy-makers have cited opposition of 
developed States to a strong international deep seabed authority as an example 
of the freezing of power. However, Brazil has been willing to compromise, in 
contrast to the radical less developed States, by favoring a major role for 
multinational corporations as well. 
So in applying the first three foreign policy characteristics (diversification, 
expansion of interests, and greater assertiveness of interests), Brazilian ocean 
policy has generally been pragmatic. Another example of pragmatism in 
ocean affairs is the extension of the territorial sea to 200 miles in 1970. This 
has been considered as "a true archetype of a new style of foreign policy" 
since distinctive Brazilian interests were subsequently asserted successfully, 
without a confrontation with the United States.!! It is significant that this 
analysis by a left-leaning critic of the military regime scores current Brazilian 
foreign policy pragmatism as "opportunism," but still acknowledges the 
change in Brazilian posture vis-a-vis the United States from deference to 
assertiveness of interests and the positive results achieved therefrom. 
Brazil's emergence as a maritime power therefore parallels and is part of 
broader Brazilian emergence as a major power. This thesis is examined in 
10. See Comment, The United States' Legislative Response to the Third United Nation, Conference on the 
Law of the Sea Deadlock, 2 B.C. INT"L & COMPo L. REV 409 (1979). 
11. C. ESTEVAN MARTINS. BRASIL - ESTADOS UNlDOS DOS 60 AOS 70, at 56-58 (Sao Paulo 
1972); C. LAFER & F. PENA. ARGENTINA Y BRASIL EN EL SISTEMA DE RELACIONES INTERNA· 
CIONALES 114 (Buenos Aires 1973). 
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detail in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE CASE OF BRAZIL. 
Ocean affairs are also distinctive, so that trends in Brazilian ocean policy are 
not derived merely from trends in Brazilian foreign policy as affected by the 
international system. 
The analysis of Brazilian ocean affairs in the book calls attention to 
maritime trends and events which are distinctive, as well as those which are 
derivative in nature or linked to broader issues. Ocean affairs in general, like 
Brazilian ocean policy in particular, are distinctive in at least five ways, justi-
fying a separate and independent focus. 
First, ocean affairs overlap both domestic and foreign policy and constitute 
a relatively cohesive, distinguishable universe or sub-system of national 
events. Domestically, a maritime community manages interrelated maritime 
interests, including naval affairs, shipping, and ocean resources, with the navy 
involved in all aspects of maritime affairs. Internationally, defense and pursuit 
of maritime interests involve interaction between national ocean policies and 
participation in international maritime conferences and negotiations, all with 
their own particular traditions and dynamics. Therefore a maritime environ-
ment often conditions ocean politics in ways distinctive from politics involving 
land masses. Ocean policy not only exhibits distinctive patterns, but also is 
having an increasing impact on both national and foreign affairs. 
Second, the increasing importance of ocean policy for domestic affairs 
justifies extended examination of Brazilian maritime affairs. The growth of 
naval and merchant marine power, more intensive exploitation of ocean 
resources, and a 200-mile territorial sea since 1970, have had an increasing 
impact on national development. The navy's responsibility for development 
and security of the country's extensive riverine network has linked maritime 
affairs to national integration as well. 
Third, the increasing international importance of maritime affairs justifies 
an extended examination of ocean policy. Ocean affairs occupy an important 
position in international politics and in foreign policy because of technological, 
economic, and political changes. New resources extraction possibilities and 
greater ocean uses have evoked complex national and international responses. 
At the global level, changes have been unsettling as demands for a new ocean 
order have escalated. Developed States, as the primary beneficiaries of the old 
ocean order, have faced a challenge of accommodating change with traditional 
policies. Developing States have faced the dual challenge of promoting a new 
global ocean order more compatible with their interests and forging a national 
ocean policy, for all practical purposes, for the first time. 
Fourth, Brazil is a particularly important example of these challenges for 
Third World ocean policies because its emergence as a major power is paral-
leled by its emergence as a maritime power. Ocean affairs have become in-
creasingly important for Brazilian foreign policy, and Brazil, in turn, has 
1979] BRAZILIAN LOS POLICY 533 
come to occupy a distinctive position in bilateral, regional, and global negotia-
tions for a new ocean order. Although national ocean policy has evolved er-
ratically, Brazil has been prominent among developing States in building 
maritime capabilities across a broad front. Consequently, Brazil is increasing-
ly coming to stand between the First and Third Worlds in the maritime 
sphere. 12 
Fifth, the increasing outreach of Brazilian ocean policy involves complex in-
teraction with other national ocean policies of both developed and developing 
States and invites comparisons with them. The development of a comprehen-
sive profile of Brazilian ocean policy throughout the course of the book 
hopefully will encourage other overviews of national ocean policies, especially 
those of Third World States which have been few and far between, and will 
generate fruitful comparisons. Many Third World States have been too 
burdened with other problems to develop an ocean policy or only have very 
limited maritime potential. The book is one of the first, if not the first, com-
prehensive profile of the ocean policy of a significant Third World State. 
A comprehensive survey is made in the book of all aspects of Brazilian 
ocean policy, including domestic influences, participation at international 
maritime conferences, naval affairs, ocean resources, and shipping. The first 
portion of the study presents a general overview of Brazilian ocean policy 
(Chapters 2 through 6), with later chapters presenting more specific profiles of 
major maritime sectors (Chapters 5 through 8). Chapters 5 and 6 on the navy 
overlap both portions of the study since the navy at once is responsible for 
overall coordination of maritime affairs and is itself a major maritime sector. 
The two parts of the study are further integrated, because the first, general 
portion of the study presents many findings on which the later, sectoral 
chapters build, while the latter part of the study indicates how ocean policy is 
expressed through specific sectors. A final chapter compares findings about 
Brazilian ocean policy with other States, both developing and developed. t 
12. The Brazilian Navy's representative on the Brazilian delegation to the Third United Na· 
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea has emphasized that Brazilian maritime interests are not 
typical of either those of developing or developed States, so that Brazil should not identify ex-
clusively with either group. Souto Maior de Castro, 0 Direcito do Mar e 0 Problema do Mar Ter-
ritorial, REVISTA MARITIMA BRASILEIRA, July-Sept. 1973, at 86; see also 0 que se espera da 
diplomacia brasileira, 0 Estado do Sao Paulo, June 11, 1971, at 3; Fishlow, Flying Down to Rio: 
U.S.-Brazil Relations, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 387 (1978). 
t This study is a unique and significant analysis of the approach of a major developing State to 
the Law of the Sea. It is indispensable reading for anyone seeking to comprehend the deadlock 
that has obstructed UNCLOS III negotiations and how to best resolve the different interests that 
created the impasse. 
